We investigate the possibility of using error correcting codes in digital signatures.
98 manner (i.e. with protection against active attack). We will restrict ourselves to systems which do not require the sender and the receiver to share a secret key K .
The basic requirements are : (i) s(.) is easily computable, s(x) is concise (e.g. from 8 up to 128 bytes), (ii) s(.) is unforgeable : given y in the signature domain, it is computationally unfeasible to calculate a quasi inverse +(y) of y.
To avoid small falsifications (e.g. change of a name, of an amount in a payment message), we add an extra condition :
(iii) Two messages with the same length must differ from d symbols or blocks.
In the following we assume that the message x is composed of symbols x i belonging to an alphabet X, then x = (xl, XZ, ... x k ) , we set [k]={ 1,2,...,k}+
We distinguish two types of attacks :
(a) Given x find x' such that s(x')=s(x).
(b) Find two messages x and x' such that s(x')=s(x).
This two types have some similarities with the so called "known plaintext" and "chosen plaintext" attacks in a classical cryptographic system for confidentiality.
A more realistic attack of type (a), productive for the intruder, is the following : (a') Given a message x and y = s(x), a fraudulent message x' partially specified in a subset I of symbol positions, find x ) f o r j E J =[k]V such that s(x)=s(x').
A similar attack (b') of type (b) can be defined.
In data networks, a reasonable goal should be to gather together different aspects of integrity, in particular :
-error detection and correction -manipulation detection and localization.
Merging these items brings some "technical" problems. One major difficulty comes from the following fact : nearly all constructing methods for error-correcting codes are based on linear computations which are well known for their cryptographic weakness.
We studyseveral schemes which use linear combinations of the different elements of the message.
II. RANDOM KNAPSACK SCHEMES
When designing an integrity signature scheme without secrete key, a basic need is to dispose of a one-way function 6. In contrast with well known public key algorithms such as RSA, there is no necessity here to invert $J with the help of some hidden trap door information. Then we can consider purely random generated knapsack :
Generate k random numbers a l , a2, ..., ak bounded by M ; and calculate sfx) = Ci Xi ai . In this paragraph, the alphabet X is binary, X = (0,1} .
When k is large enough, this scheme is deeply insecure against attack of type (b) as shown by our next proposition.
Proposition 1 : Given k integers aI, a2, .... ak with a i I M , it is always possible to find I , J E { 1,2 ,..., k }, I d , such that
For instance if k =220 (message with 128 Kbyte) and M = 2loo, an attack needs about 20.106 additions.
Proof : After sorting, we can assume ai-1 I ai for 1 < i I k . We derive a new sequence of length k : bl=al and bi =ai -ai-l for 1 <i S k. There exists an element a; in { bi } such that u', I M/k. If = bj , we then discard from the sequence { U i 1, the two elements uj and u,-l involved in u ) . Then we determine an other element u'2 such that u'2 I M / ( k -2 ) . Iterating the process k'=k/4 times, we then obtain k'
Assuming than k=2U, M=2', we have at our disposal a new sequence {a'i 1 of length k'=2"-' wjth elements bounded by M'=2-+'. We consider the recursion : Notice that this algorithm is not probabilistic : at each step, the worst case is considered. To perform attack of type (a), algorithms which require more computational effort exist. A probabilistic algorithm will appear as a consequence of proposition 2.
III . ERROR-LOCALIZING CODES SCHEME
We present a scheme combining one way function and error correcting code :
Split the message x into blocks xi E Fi of length u (e.g. u = loo), x = (XIJZ, ... , xk) , then use a one way injective function &(.) from F; to F' (e.g. IF' I =q = 212*). For instance @(xi) can be written as $;(xi) = $(i hi), where "I" stands for concatenation. We therefore obtain k symbols n = $jjlxi) in F . Encode (yj, B, ... , yk) with a [n,k,d 1 error correcting code over F . The n-k (e.g. n-k = 4 ) redundancy symbols %+I, %+2, ... , yi form the signature s.
Detection and correction
We consider codes over very large alphabet I ? of cardinality q . Then n < q, and we can restrict ourselves to MDS code. It is well known that most of the error correcting codes are far from perfection. More precisely, the density A = 2-5 of the packing is small ; A is the fraction of the space F n which lies inside the spheres Bt of radius t centered on the code words. Therefore, most of space may be used for 
Localization or correction
Using Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, it is possible to localized errors in O(n.d) operations over F. But, due to the presence of the one way functions &, the error evaluation on the can not be exploited to correct errors on the xi. . However, for some type of messages, errors can perhaps be corrected by try and error procedures for instance, by exploiting natural redundancy of a language.
The error correction algorithm can be carried out only if it is possible to invert each q5i for each position i in error using some (secret) trap door information.
Weakness of the scheme in low characteristic
It is important to select the field F with a high characteristic. For instance if the characteristic of F' is 2, i.e. q = 2v, then it is possible to perform an attack of type In the following paragraph, we present an attack adapted for high characteristic.
We consider a generalization proposed by Gaston Gonnet, Waterloo of the binary knapsack scheme for signature. To precise this scheme it is sufficient to present an attack of type (a') which consists in solving the following problem :
Given a finite set of indices J , an integer a<M, and a function T(.,.) from X X J into 2, fiid a sequence in Xm, X = ( X , ) ,~J which satisfies
Remark : Notice that solving problem A reduces to solving the following knapsack :
When we exhibit a sequence x for a set of indices J which verifies (l), we say that set J is a support for a . The goal is to find an algorithm to resolve the problem for small or medium support size V 1.
In [4] , this kind of problem has been studied in a algebraic structure different from the additive group (Z,+) of integers. The considered structure G is the group of invertible 2x2 matrices with entries in the field Fp . The algorithm proposed in subgroup ZlPZ with large prime P , a similar method can be used embedding ZlPZ in Z and using the Chinese remainder theorem.
Let M be an upper bound for the possible values of a . We choose M as a product of coprime numbers M = I I r E w ] P, where P r z P , P <2P. We assume that IJ I= 2p b. It will appear that Wl> 2P.
Setting J = 4' ' and by successive dichotomies over J, we obtain :
2s where 2s In 2s
We thus get p partitions of J for r+l = p, p-l,..., 2,l :
SE [ul-.] The algorithm has p steps. The principle is to determine for each step I and each set J' = .(' , s E [2' -7, a set of K ( P ,~) solutions to the equation 
Algorithm complexity :
The basic procedure is applied W-1+ 2@+ ...+ 20 = 3 times. If we assume that the complexity of computing one value T(xjj) is O( l), the overall complexity is K = 2P P log(P) p = p2 D + p for a number U I=% b of symbols used to adapt the signature.
If, we set K I=2a, M =2m, P =D, we then get : m =pp, & =2p.
For a = 1, we obtain b = 2p = 2 m / p , K = ~J J +~/ P ( m / p ) 2 which reaches its minimum for p -6 , we then have K = 2 2 G m and = U 1=2&+1 G&.
If we consider larger blocks (e.g. a =loo) we can choose b =I, and we obtain the same type of result : @ 2 2 G m and = UI = 2 G . OOO bits, the process needs about 106 operations.
If the signature domain is sufficiently large (say m=1000 bits) this attack is clearly ineffective. The security of the scheme proposed in 9 III remains an open problem when the field F is Z/qZ where q is a prime such that Zog(q) = 128, and C is a [n,k] code with n-k =8, leading to a signature which is m = (n-k)log(q) = 128.8=210 bits long.
